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Bitcoin was created in 2008 to serve as an alternative payment mechanism for the 
underbanked and unbanked, or those in regions where the formal financial system suffers from 
rampant corruption or ceases to exist altogether. However, criminals and terrorists quickly 
exploited Bitcoin’s unique properties, namely its peer-to-peer nature and pseudo-anonymity, to 
facilitate extensive terrorist financing and money laundering schemes. Government reactions to 
safeguard national security interests have been extremely varied, ranging from outright bans to 
passive tolerance. This inconsistency stems from how to effectively classify Bitcoin. On one side 
are those who argue Bitcoin is a currency, and on the other are those who claim it is a type of 
asset. In the United States alone, these discrepancies have led to a bureaucratic turf war between 
different regulatory bodies, namely the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Association, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Internal 
Revenue Service. This study seeks to move beyond the existing legal frameworks, arguing that 
Bitcoin should be classified as a technology and regulation should rest with private sector 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Money is integral to the survival of terrorist groups. Without a consistent and reliable 
source of income, terrorist groups would not be able to maintain daily administrative tasks, 
support their members or carry out their attacks. In effect, terrorist groups would cease to “exist 
as organizations” altogether (Freeman 2011, 461). Because of the centrality of money, therefore, 
terrorist groups procure funding from a variety of legal and illegal sources, including from state 
sponsors, petty theft, illicit trade, extortion, charitable donations, and personal wealth (461).  
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, law enforcement agencies have 
established several effective counterterrorist finance methods for thwarting the movement of fiat 
currencies, or government-issued currencies, to terrorist groups. However, some argue the 
success of such counterterrorist finance programs may encourage terrorist groups to look 
elsewhere to finance their activities, namely the growing cryptocurrency market (Dion-Schwarz, 
Manheim, and Johnston 2019, 1-2). It is worth mentioning that while there are several hundred 
different types of cryptocurrencies, the focus of this paper will be primarily on Bitcoin.1  
Since Bitcoin was first created in 2008, its use has grown exponentially across the globe, 
bringing unprecedented benefits to individuals in societies where the formal banking sector is 
marred by corruption or, whether due to geographic location or systemic conflict, ceases to exist 
altogether. However, this widespread popularity has become a significant cause for concern for 
law enforcement officials and intelligence agencies worldwide.  
The reasons are threefold. First, Bitcoin has a ‘pseudo-anonymous’ nature, meaning that 
while bitcoins can be traced to a certain computer in some instances or identified with a certain 
public key that is associated with a user, that user is never required to reveal his or her ‘real-
 
1 This essay distinguishes between ‘Bitcoin’ (capitalized) – the technology and form of cryptocurrency, and ‘bitcoin’ 
(uncapitalized) – the individual units of the cryptocurrency.  
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world’ identity. Second, Bitcoin was designed as a peer-to-peer platform so as to bypass the 
regulatory instruments of a state’s traditional financial sector. Third, the nature of Bitcoin 
transactions makes them transnational, near instantaneous, and irreversible. These points taken 
together – plus the fact that the creation and use of new cryptocurrencies has outpaced policy, 
regulation, and law enforcement initiatives – have enabled terrorist organizations and organized 
crime syndicates to abuse the Bitcoin system for terrorist financing, money laundering, and other 
criminal activities.  
Consequently, several regulatory bodies in the United States (U.S.) have endeavored to 
establish regulatory jurisdiction over Bitcoin transactions, namely the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). All four 
entities view Bitcoin differently and have attempted to regulate Bitcoin accordingly, by imposing 
their relevant legal frameworks.  
For example, FinCEN views Bitcoin as a currency and has determined regulation 
according to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The CFTC regards Bitcoin as a commodity, citing the 
Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) as the appropriate regulatory framework. The SEC considers 
Bitcoin to be a type of security and advocates regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act (SEA). Finally, the IRS issued a Guidance in 2014 determining that 
Bitcoin is a property for federal tax purposes.  
Although there is merit to each argument, Bitcoin was ultimately created to purposely 
avoid regulation by formal financial institutions. As such, none of the perspectives or regulatory 
frameworks proposed by FinCEN, the CFTC, the SEC, and the IRS truly account for the unique 
properties of Bitcoin as well as users’ interests in a secure system of transactions that is safe 
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from the purview of government entities. In addition, these competing narratives have led to a 
bureaucratic turf war over regulation, making transacting in Bitcoin extremely confusing for 
users. Moreover, these competing regulations threaten over-regulation, which may push users to 
seek illicit means to use Bitcoin and escape regulation altogether.  
To avoid these issues, I argue that Bitcoin should be classified as a technology with 
financial components, and regulation should rest with private sector technology companies, 
namely an international association known as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). I 
propose a three-tiered framework for regulation: at the bottom in the first tier are individual users 
who are regulated by the second tier, which is composed of companies offering services in 
Bitcoin such as buying, selling, exchanging, or storing bitcoins in a wallet. These Bitcoin 
companies are regulated by the third tier, represented by the W3C. The W3C acts in accordance 
with state governments and Bitcoin companies to establish certain standards for the community 
of Bitcoin users. To truly counter terrorist financing and money laundering with Bitcoin, and to 
effectively protect national security interests, regulation must be transnational in nature and 










CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction  
Since the creation of the Internet in the early 1980s, everyday objects and transactions 
have become increasingly digitized, with impacts permeating virtually all sectors of human life 
including the military, communication, healthcare, infrastructure, energy, and financial divisions. 
The financial sector has been impacted by the advent of intangible, ‘digital’ currencies as an 
alternative to traditional, tangible fiat money, which is a government-issued paper currency that 
largely replaced the gold standard system.  
Digital currencies, also known as cryptocurrencies, come in two main forms: centralized 
or decentralized/distributed. Examples of the former include ‘loyalty points’ from retail 
companies or ‘air miles’; they are confined within the centralized structure of a particular entity 
(Nian and Chuen 2015, 7). Decentralized digital currencies, on the other hand, can be used in 
transactions inside and outside of a network, facilitated by the use of readily and widely 
accessible open-source software. Examples include Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Bitcoin. Since first 
proposed by creator Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, Bitcoin has gained significant publicity as the 
world’s first decentralized cryptocurrency and the current leader of the cryptocurrency market 
(Corbet et al. 2019, 182).  
Properties of Bitcoin 
Nakamoto designed Bitcoin to be “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic 
proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other” 
(Nakamoto 2008, 1). This direct peer-to-peer (P2P) nature of the Bitcoin system discounts the 
need for third parties, such as a central bank or another regulatory entity, to facilitate and validate 
transactions. Bitcoin operates on a fully decentralized and distributed open-source software 
 5 
platform, meaning that not only can anyone access it, but also each user is connected to each 
other in the network and can leave or enter the network at any time (Nian and Chuen 2015, 11-
12). 
Important components of the Bitcoin system include: bitcoins, wallets, public and private 
keys, and the blockchain. The coins themselves are not tangible, rather they are composed of 
lines of code. Each user has a wallet to store his or her bitcoins. These wallets give the user an 
address, “akin to a bank account number”, and therefore also a pseudo-identity, however a user is 
rarely required to disclose his or her real-world identity when obtaining a wallet, rather what 
information is required can usually be “fabricated” (Nian and Chuen 2015, 15; Bollen 2013, 6; 
La Huis and McKeown, 2017, p. 5). For example, only an email address is required to obtain 
certain digital wallets. Payments are made by directing transactions to the address of a wallet 
(Bollen 2013, 6).  
Each wallet, and therefore each user, is connected to a public and private key. The public 
key, as the name suggests, is made available to the entire network and is used “to generate 
Bitcoin addresses, sign transactions, and verify payments” (Nian and Chuen 2015, 21). In other 
words, the public key is “the Bitcoin address to and from which payments are sent” and it is used 
to verify signatures of transactions that are signed with the private key (21). It is possible to 
derive a public key from a private key but not vice versa, so it is extremely important that private 
keys be stored securely in the wallet (21). The user that controls the keys associated with the 
bitcoin is the only person able to transfer the bitcoin; loss of the keys means the bitcoins are no 
longer accessible (Bollen 2013, 7). Figure 1 depicts how a bitcoin transaction works using the 














Finally, the blockchain is a public list on which each transaction is recorded. All records 
include the public keys of both the sender and the recipient, as well as the amount transacted and 
the time that the transaction occurred (Nian and Chuen 2015, 22).  
At the time of writing, there are three main ways users can acquire bitcoins: through an 
online purchase or from a Bitcoin vending machine, in exchange for goods and services, or 
through mining (Volastro 2014). Mining is the process by which ‘miners’ solve complex 
mathematical problems to process transactions, which are then added to the blockchain after it is 
determined by a consensus that the transaction is valid (Nian and Chuen 2015, 19-20). In this 
way, miners – not a third party such as a central bank or other regulatory entity – are responsible 
for updating, maintaining, and verifying transactions on the blockchain. Figure 2 depicts the 
























In addition to operating independently of a central authority such as a central bank, Bitcoin is 
also not linked to a commodity like gold. Consequently, the value of bitcoins is derived from 
users’ trust and confidence in the system and its algorithms (Chu, Nadarajah, and Chan 2015, 2; 
Uhl et al. 2018, 9). 
Owing to these properties, Bitcoin has ushered in a new transformative era in global 
banking. However, it has also caught the attention of law enforcement officials and intelligence 
agencies for its potential use in money laundering, terrorist financing, and other criminal 
activities.  
Criminality concerns of Bitcoin 
There are several qualities to Bitcoin that make it attractive to criminals. First, Bitcoin is 
‘pseudo-anonymous’; certain identifying information can be gleaned from the system, but not 
anything explicit. For example, the publication of a users’ public keys on the blockchain means 
that transactions “to and from any Bitcoin address can be traced” to a source (Nian and Chuen 
2015, 22). Moreover, the amount and time of the transaction may reveal important information 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Bitcoin Mining and Verification Process 
 8 
about habits or patterns unique to the parties involved. A wallet can also be tied to the specific 
Internet Protocol address of a user’s device. Despite this, users are almost never required to 
disclose their real-world identities, which may present a huge incentive for potential criminals. 
Second, the P2P nature of transactions can enable the financing of terrorist groups, as 
Bitcoin transactions need not pass through “the regulatory controls that third-party institutions… 
are legally bound to perform” (Reynolds and Irwin 2017, 173). Third, and related, Bitcoin is 
attractive due to the “global reach and speed” of transactions (La Huis and McKeown 2017, 5). 
This is partly due to the fact that transactions are not subject to regulatory oversight, but it is also 
due to the nature of the technology itself. Transactions can be “conducted nearly instantaneously 
and across many borders”, which may prove advantageous for terrorist groups who may want “to 
quickly move illicit funds to and from a wide variety of places around the world” (5). It also 
reduces the time horizons law enforcement agencies have to detect and intercept suspicious 
payments (Brill and Keene 2014, 14). 
Fourth, Bitcoin is attractive for its relative ease and low cost of use (Brill and Keene 
2014, 14). Using Bitcoin arguably requires very little technical skill, and the only materials 
needed are devices that can be connected to the Internet (La Huis and McKeown 2017, 5; Brill 
and Keene 2014, 14). In this way, transferring bitcoins can be as easy as sending an email. 
Finally, the fact that payments are irreversible may be attractive to terrorist groups (Brill 
and Keene 2014, 7). There is no additional verification needed to finalize a payment, which 
enables transactions to be processed more quickly (14). Moreover, once the money is sent it 
cannot be reversed, which is logically important for terrorist groups that remain extremely 
dependent on reliable financial contributions (14). 
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Despite this discussion, some experts doubt the utility of Bitcoin in terrorist financing or 
money laundering schemes. After conducting semi-structured interviews with subject matter 
experts, Carroll and Windle (2018) concluded that there is simply not enough empirical data to 
demonstrate that terrorists and criminals are using Bitcoin to meaningfully enhance revenues. 
They argue Bitcoin is still too new and underdeveloped of a system; terrorists prefer instead to 
stick to trusted methods of generating and moving money using traditional cash, hawala systems, 
and the drug trade. In a similar vein, Dion-Schwarz, Manheim, and Johnston (2019) contend that 
the money raised by terrorists and criminals through Bitcoin comprises a negligible portion of 
their revenues. Related, Goldman et al. (2017) determined that instances where terrorists and 
criminals use Bitcoin are purely “anecdotal” and not representative of a growing trend (2).   
The other side of the debate houses figures such as Yaya Fanusie, former economic and 
counterterrorist finance analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency. Fanusie (2019) uncovered 
the first identifiable instance of terrorists using Bitcoin and has warned that, on the contrary, 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations have started to depend more readily on Bitcoin, as 
their more traditional sources of financing have suffered more frequent disruptions from law 
enforcement in recent years. To justify these arguments, Fanusie and other experts have 
highlighted the growing number of cases involving terrorists, criminals, or individuals 
sympathetic to their causes.  
Prominent instances include a 2018 report from Europol in which the organization 
estimated that in Europe, criminals were using cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin to facilitate the 
money laundering of “as much as $5.5 billion (£4 billion) in illegal money” (Corcoran 2018). 
More recently, in 2020 American citizen Zoobia Shahnaz was dealt a 13-year prison sentence in 
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the U.S. for funneling $150,000 in Bitcoin to the Islamic State (U.S. Department of Justice 
2020).  
In yet another example, Hamas has reportedly developed an algorithm that creates new 
Bitcoin donation addresses or a new Bitcoin wallet for each donor (Smith 2019; Liv 2019, 5-6). 
Through this campaign, members send Bitcoin addresses to potential donors, for example, who 
can then directly transfer money to Hamas (Azani and Liv 2018, 4). Consequently, it is estimated 
that in less than one month (between March 29 and April 16, 2019), Hamas raised 0.6 bitcoin – 
approximately $3,300 – through “website-created wallets” (Wilson and Williams 2019). Fanusie 
(2019) argues that this objectively small amount of money is not indicative of its importance. 
Terrorism is a notoriously cheap enterprise; the September 11 terrorist attacks – the pinnacle of 
attacks to date, being the deadliest and most sophisticated – allegedly cost al-Qaeda only 
$500,000 to execute but produced approximately $3.3 trillion dollars in damages (Carter and 
Cox 2011). In other words, for every dollar al-Qaeda spent, it cost the U.S. $7 million (Carter 
and Cox 2011).  
In light of these revelations, this paper takes the stance that Bitcoin can and does facilitate 
terrorist financing and money laundering. An added concern for law enforcement officials and 
policymakers is that the creation and use of new cryptocurrencies has proliferated exponentially 
in recent years, outpacing policy and regulation. The need to devise appropriate regulatory 
strategies is exacerbated by the fact that Bitcoin was designed explicitly to avoid traditional 
regulatory measures. This has led to a literary explosion concerning how best to classify and 
regulate Bitcoin. Most of the existing literature can be split into two camps: Bitcoin should be 
classified as a currency versus as an asset.  
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Review of existing literature: Bitcoin as a currency 
 Most of the early literature (for example Kaplanov 2012) on Bitcoin classification argues 
it should be treated as a new type of digital or virtual currency, alternative to traditional 
government-backed fiat currencies. Turpin (2014) notes that Bitcoin is essentially the digital 
equivalent of cash, while McCallum (2015) presents the argument that there has been a historical 
trend towards electronic and digital banking; Bitcoin is simply the latest evolutionary step of the 
development. Grinberg (2011) cites the acceptance of the Iraqi Swiss dinar to defend against the 
popular criticism that Bitcoin cannot be considered a currency because it is not backed by a 
government nor tied to a commodity. Wiseman (2016) criticized the IRS’ 2014 decision to 
classify Bitcoin has a property for tax purposes, asserting that a market analysis demonstrates 
that most users are treating Bitcoin as a currency. Schilling and Uhlig (2019) create a model that 
demonstrates Bitcoin can compete as a viable alternative to traditional fiat currencies in the 
current monetary system, whereas Carrick (2016) assesses that Bitcoin serves as a viable 
compliment to other currencies.   
 If Bitcoin is to be classified as a currency, the corresponding legal framework that would 
dictate the terms of its regulation is the BSA, and the body responsible for overseeing this 
regulation would be FinCEN, which is located within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. This 
is significant, as FinCEN (2013) has declared that Bitcoin exchangers and administrators would 
be classified as Money Services Businesses (MSBs) and therefore are subject to strict reporting 
and registration requirements.  
Review of existing literature: Bitcoin as an asset  
 The literature within this category is much less straightforward and divided into many 
subsections according to different types of assets. Yermack (2013); Dorfman (2017); Colville 
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(2014); and Claeys, Demertzis, and Efstathiou (2018) argue that Bitcoin should be 
conceptualized more as some sort of ‘speculative asset’, as users exploit the volatile price 
fluctuations with a view towards maximizing profits. Both Glaser et al. (2014) and Baur, Hong, 
and Lee (2015) conduct studies analyzing the behavior and intentions of users by looking at 
trading and transaction data on the blockchain, ultimately determining that the majority of 
holders primarily use Bitcoin as an asset for investment. 
 Others argue that Bitcoin should be treated like a commodity. Gronwald (2019) 
compared the Bitcoin market to those of crude oil and gold to demonstrate that Bitcoin functions 
most like a commodity, whereas Shahzad et al. (2019) discuss the viability of bitcoin as a safe 
haven asset in comparison to other commodities like gold. Prentis (2015) and Mandjee (2015) 
contend that Bitcoin fits into the definition outlined by the CEA, citing the law’s “and all other 
goods and articles” specification (Commodity Exchange Act of 1936). This aligns with the 
CFTC’s 2015 ruling that Bitcoin should be considered a commodity. If true, this would mean 
that the legal framework most appropriate to regulate Bitcoin transactions would be the CEA, 
and the body responsible for the regulation would be the CFTC.  
 Still others claim that Bitcoin should be classified as a security. Yang (2013) and Swartz 
(2014) argue that the definitions of a security outlined in the Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA 
are broad enough to include Bitcoin so long as it can be conceptualized as an investment 
contract. Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti (2019) conclude that regulations for Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) can be applied to Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) in Bitcoin and thus Bitcoin 
should be regulated as a security. If deemed a security, the entity responsible for Bitcoin 
regulation would be the SEC, with the aforementioned two laws imposing several regulatory and 
reporting requirements. However, the SEC has taken a contextual and ad hoc approach to 
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classifying Bitcoin, arguing that regulation will depend on the nature and purpose of the Bitcoin 
transaction or ICO.  
 Another branch of literature suggests that Bitcoin should be classified as a type of 
property. Low and Teo (2017) and Fox (2019) support this claim, citing private law rights. 
Chason (2019) argues that Bitcoin transactions resemble real estate property transactions. The 
IRS (2014) determined that Bitcoin should be considered a property for federal tax purposes. 
Roman (2015) outlines extensively the repercussions for users arising from this framework of 
regulation.  
Finally, there is a burgeoning bulk of literature including White et al. (2019), Burniske 
and White (2017), and Symitsi and Chalvatzis (2019), that suggests Bitcoin should be classified 
as an entirely new asset class or type of technology altogether. PwC (2018) and Uhl et al. (2018) 
both consider Bitcoin a new type of intangible asset. Within this subdivision, ideas about 
regulatory bodies or frameworks are less apparent or nonexistent.  
Purpose of this study 
 In the current environment, there seems to be a bureaucratic turf war between FinCEN, 
the CFTC, the SEC, and the IRS over the proper classification of Bitcoin and appropriate 
regulatory measures. This paper seeks to answer, what is the best way to classify and regulate 
Bitcoin to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing in the U.S.? It adds to the existing 
group of arguments that Bitcoin should be classified as a new type of technological asset, but it 
fills the gap in the literature by going beyond the existing legal regulatory frameworks to propose 
an entirely new framework for Bitcoin regulation.  
This framework will be assessed according to how well it considers two criteria: the 
unique properties of Bitcoin and anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism 
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(AML/CFT) concerns. Because Bitcoin was created specifically to avoid formal regulation, it is 
important that the framework addresses its unique properties – namely the P2P nature, 
decentralized organization, price volatility, and pseudo-anonymity – in order to effectively 
regulate it. Moreover, because of its potential to threaten national security by facilitating terrorist 
financing and money laundering, it is also important that these frameworks include appropriate 




































CHAPTER 3: METHODS  
 
This study will compare the existing legal frameworks – the BSA, the CEA, the 
Securities Act of 1933, the SEA, and the IRS’ 2014 Guidance – against my own framework for 
Bitcoin regulation. The effectiveness of these frameworks will be evaluated according to two 
criteria: how well they account for the unique properties of Bitcoin and how well they address 


































CHAPTER 4: DATA  
 
This section will discuss the existing legal frameworks that have claimed jurisdiction 
over Bitcoin transactions. In each subsection, I will begin by giving a brief overview of the law. I 
will then analyze each framework according to how well it accounts for the unique properties of 
Bitcoin and how well it addresses concerns regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. I 
will then conclude by introducing and analyzing my own framework in the last subsection.  




 The BSA was designed to detect and prevent money laundering and other criminal 
financial activities by requiring financial institutions to keep records and file reports “involving 
currency transactions and… customer relationships” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
2005, 1). Such ‘financial institutions’ are defined as “[e]ach agent, agency branch, or office 
within the [U.S.] of any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an 
organized business concern” (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2020). This includes entities 
such as U.S. banks, savings associations, insurance companies, casinos, and, importantly, MSBs 
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency n.d.; OFAC Sanctions Attorney, n.d.).  
An MSB is defined as “[a] person wherever located doing business, whether or not on a 
regular basis or as an organized or licensed business concern, wholly or in substantial part within 
the United States” and includes entities that issue, sell, or redeem money orders or traveler’s 
checks; exchange foreign currencies; act as money transmitters; cash checks; and provide or sell 
Prepaid Access (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network n.d.). Crucially, an MSB does not 
include “[a] person registered with, and functionally regulated or examined by, the SEC or the 
CFTC” (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2020). 
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 Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are the 
two main means through which financial institutions are required to disclose their transactions 
under the BSA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2005, 1). A financial institution must 
complete a CTR for transactions over $10,000 and is required to include certain personally 
identifiable information (PII) about the person conducting the transaction, including: their name, 
street address, social security number (SSN) or taxpayer identification number (TIN) if they are a 
non-U.S. resident, and their date of birth (2). A financial institution is required to submit a SAR 
for “any transactions aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money laundering, 
suspected terrorist financing activities, or violations of the BSA” (45). The SAR form includes 
PII such as: the name of the customer and any other suspects, SSN or TIN, and the customer’s 
account number (45). 
 In 2019 FinCEN issued a Guidance claiming that any entities dealing in convertible 
virtual currencies (CVC), which includes Bitcoin, were considered MSBs under the ‘money 
transmitter’ provision (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 2019a, 1). FinCEN argued:  
“…as money transmission involves the acceptance and transmission of value that substitutes 
for currency by any means, transactions denominated in CVC will be subject to FinCEN 
regulations regardless of whether the CVC is represented by a physical or digital token, 
whether the type of ledger used to record the transactions is centralized or distributed, or the 
type of technology utilized for the transmission of value” (7). 
 
In this way, entities that accept and transmit Bitcoin are required to register as an MSB under the 
BSA, and they are therefore subject to BSA reporting requirements, which include filing CTRs 
and SARs.  
Bitcoin properties covered  
 Within this framework, Bitcoin is considered to be a currency. This is problematic for 
several reasons. First, “Bitcoin is not issued nor sanctioned by the US, or by any government” 
and therefore cannot be considered legal tender (Mandjee 2015, 167). In other words, it cannot 
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be accepted “for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues” and therefore does not operate like 
traditional fiat currencies (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2011). Second, the production of 
bitcoins is capped at 21 million, after which no more bitcoins will be ‘minted’, or mined. This 
arguably undermines its effective use as a currency, as it is restricted in use unlike fiat 
currencies, which can be widely and infinitely used and exchanged.   
Third, Bitcoin categorically does not fit the three main functions of money: a medium of 
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. As a medium of exchange, Bitcoin must be 
recognized by others as an acceptable mechanism for which people can exchange goods, 
services, or assets (Cohn 2016, 139). This is partially true for Bitcoin; in some cases, Bitcoin “is 
actually used to exchange goods and services, to allow a trade without direct use of goods” 
(Mandjee 2015, 169).  
However in reality, Bitcoin usage as a medium of exchange remains “miniscule” 
(Yermack 2015, 32). Indeed several countries have outright banned the use of Bitcoin altogether, 
including Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Vietnam (Library of Congress 2018, 4). This excludes a plethora of countries – among them 
China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Colombia – where there is an “implicit ban” on Bitcoin usage (4). 
These bans have most likely contributed to the fact that only a handful of major retail companies 
accept payment in Bitcoin, which is indicative of the fact that it is not an appropriate or effective 
medium of exchange. Moreover, a user must actually possess bitcoins in order to transact with 
them, whereas people can conveniently make purchases without cash through the use of a credit 
card (Yermack 2015, 37).  
 As a unit of account, Bitcoin must “[place] a value or price on goods, services, or assets” 
(Cohn 2016, 139). This is undermined significantly by the extreme degree to which the price of 
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Bitcoin fluctuates. Figure 3 illustrates this volatility by showing that Bitcoin fluctuates much 












Because Bitcoin’s price fluctuates so quickly and so dramatically, it is difficult for 
vendors to “establish a valid reference point for setting consumer prices” (Yermack 2015, 38). 
Consequently, many vendors must rely on “unwieldy price aggregates”, such as the average 
price of bitcoins in exchanges over the last 24 hours, which results in different markets selling 
bitcoins for (sometimes significantly) different values at any given time (38). Such aggregations 
are logically not representative of the actual price of bitcoins in real time (38). This is highly 
problematic, as vendors could perhaps sell a bitcoin for much less or much more than what it is 
truly worth. From this discussion, it is clear that Bitcoin’s volatility precludes it from accurately 
and continually serving as an effective unit of account. Rather, considering its unpredictability, 
Bitcoin may be better reflective of a speculative asset and potentially facilitate or otherwise 
Figure 3: Comparison of Daily Fluctuations in the Price of Bitcoin 
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encourage arbitrage, which undermines the final function of money (Nian and Chuen 2015, 11; 
Yermack 2015, 38; Hougan, Kim, and Lerner 2019, 2). 
 Finally, as a “store of value”, Bitcoin must work to “preserve purchasing power or wealth 
in the private sector for investment purposes, or by governments in official foreign exchange 
reserves” (Cohn 2016, 139). While once procured, bitcoins technically do not have to be spent 
immediately and therefore can maintain value, the significant fluctuation of their value 
undermines their ability to “[retain their] purchasing power over time with a good deal of 
certainty” (Butler and Boylan 2010). 
 FinCEN argues that Bitcoin can be considered “a medium of exchange that can operate 
like currency but does not have all the attributes of ‘real’ currency… including legal tender 
status” (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 2019a, 7). I find this conceptualization 
fundamentally contradictory to the true meaning of a currency, as the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, under which FinCEN is located, argues that in order to be seen as “a valid and legal 
offer of payment for debts when tendered to a creditor”, currency must have legal tender status 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury 2011). Considering this contradiction, and the above 
discussion regarding Bitcoin’s unsuitability as currency, it is clear that the regulatory framework 
proposed by FinCEN does not effectively account for the unique properties of Bitcoin. 
AML/CFT protections covered 
As the foremost AML law in the U.S., the BSA logically addresses many AML/CFT 
concerns. The extensive reporting requirements, namely registering with FinCEN as an MSB and 
submitting CTRs and SARs, has significantly contributed to cracking down on money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and other criminal financial activities in the U.S.  
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In one noteworthy case, officials prosecuted seven individuals involved in an online 
bitcoin exchange “on charges of operating unlicensed money transmitting businesses, as well as 
fraud, conspiracy, and bribery” (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 2019b). Despite such 
successes, there are some noteworthy loopholes in the BSA that criminals can exploit using 
Bitcoin.  
First, using Bitcoin “to purchase real or virtual goods or services will not transform a user 
into an MSB”, and therefore this user will not be subject to the same regulatory requirements as 
an MSB (Bryans 2014, 458). This is problematic, as it does not account for instances where an 
individual uses Bitcoin to purchase arms or any other critical materials that can then be sold or 
donated to terrorist groups. Indeed it does not even apply to Bitcoin donations to terrorist groups 
in general; it would only matter if the terrorist group bought the bitcoins.  
Second, criminals can circumvent the $10,000 and $30,000 reporting thresholds for CTRs 
and SARs respectively, by transacting in smaller denominations of Bitcoin (Bryans 2014, 456). 
Finally, according to FinCEN, an entity that is already regulated by the SEC or the CFTC cannot 
be considered an MSB and therefore is not subject to regulations under the BSA. As U.S. 
regulatory bodies grapple with determining appropriate regulatory responsibility, criminals can 
benefit from this confusion by using Bitcoin in specific ways such that they would be under the 
jurisdiction of certain bodies whose regulations would have lesser repercussions or oversight 
regarding money laundering and terrorist financing activities.   
The CFTC: the CEA 
Overview 
 The CEA was created to regulate the trade of commodities futures (or the buying and 
selling of a commodity at a future date), in the U.S. so as to “foster open, transparent, 
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competitive and financially sound derivative trading markets and to prohibit fraud, manipulation 
and abusive practices in connection with derivatives and other products subject to the CEA” 
(U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2018, 1). As such, the CEA monitors illegal 
activities such as insider trading, market manipulation, and spoofing (Obie et al. 2019, 4-5).  
The CEA recognizes four important groups: commodity pool operators (CPOs), 
commodity trading advisors (CTAs), futures commission merchants (FCMs), and introducing 
brokers (IBs). Put simply, a CPO “solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or 
property… for the purpose of trading in commodity interests” (Office of the Federal Registrar 
2019, 67343). As the name suggests, a CTA is someone that advises others “as to the value of or 
the advisability of trading in commodity interests” (67343). An FCM “is an entity that solicits or 
accepts orders to buy or sell futures contracts, options on futures, retail off-exchange forex 
[foreign exchange market] contracts or swaps, and accepts money or other assets from customers 
to support such orders” (National Futures Association n.d.a). An IB essentially operates in the 
same way as an FCM, however IBs do not accept any money or other assets in support for these 
services (National Futures Association n.d.b).   
  Under the CEA, CPOs, CTAs, FCMs, and IBs are required to register with the CFTC and 
become members of the National Futures Association (National Futures Association n.d.c). By 
doing so, these firms are subjected to extensive reporting and compliance requirements, which 
include collecting PII and other sensitive information such as a customer’s name, address, 
occupation or business, previous experience with investments and futures trading, annual 
income, net worth, and age or date of birth (National Futures Association 2020, 5).  
 While the definition of a commodity under the CEA is very broad and has traditionally 
concerned products such as “agricultural commodities, metals, and energy”, the CFTC 
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determined in 2014 that Bitcoin satisfied the CEA’s definition (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission 2014; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2018, 1). As such, the CEA 
has jurisdiction “when a virtual currency is used in a derivatives contract, or if there is fraud or 
manipulation involving a virtual currency traded in interstate commerce” (U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission n.d.). 
Bitcoin properties covered 
 Within this framework, Bitcoin is considered a type of commodity. At the surface level, it 
would appear that there is some merit to this argument. Indeed, Bitcoin has many similar 
attributes to other commodities, such as gold (Mandjee 2015, 178). For example, both are not 
regulated by a federal government, both have a finite supply, and both of their prices fluctuate 
much more when compared to fiat currencies (178-179). Moreover, it appears Bitcoin can be 
used like other commodities. As such, it can be effectively traded for other goods and services or 
currencies; it can be possessed, “as a specific user has control over distribution of its Bitcoin in 
his wallet”; and lastly, it is tangible to the extent that users “have ‘an appreciable ability to guide 
the destiny of Bitcoin’” (Mandjee 2015, 179; Johnson III 2012). 
 However, market analysis also demonstrates that Bitcoin does not consistently operate 
like other commodities. For example, a key attribute of gold is acting as “hedge and safe haven 
against assets such as stocks, bonds, and [the] US Dollar” (Klein, Thu, and Walther 2018, 106). 
Hedges and safe havens are financial instruments that enable investors to mitigate some financial 
risk during times of market turbulence. Thus, if Bitcoin is a true commodity akin to gold, it 
should act as a hedge or safe haven by enabling investors to maintain or even gain value during 
times of market distress.  
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While this has been true in some instances, Bitcoin performing as a hedge or safe haven 
remains inconsistent and highly contextual, confined to circumstances relating to certain 
geopolitical developments. For example, in mid-2019 at the height of the U.S.-China trade war, 
there was an acute rise in “demand for Bitcoin, especially among Chinese investors fearing a 
devaluing of the Yuan” (de Hallivand 2020). Similarly, in January 2020 after a U.S. airstrike 
killed Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, “Bitcoin soared from under $7,000 to 
almost $8,500 for the week”, as investors anticipated “a prolonged escalation of tensions” (de 
Hallivand 2020). Figure 4 illustrates the correlations between Bitcoin’s rise in value alongside 










Figure 4: Fluctuations in Bitcoin Amidst the 2020 U.S.-Iran Conflict 
Interestingly, at the time of writing, Bitcoin has not acted in the same way in the wake of 
the global outbreak of novel coronavirus. Instead, in order to mitigate risk, investors are selling 
their riskiest assets. Coincidentally, these primarily appear to be Bitcoin holdings (Young 2020). 
As a result, on March 12, 2020, the price of Bitcoin plummeted from approximately $8,000 to 
$5,000, comprising “a loss of about 40% in the span of less than two days” (Shevchenko 2020). 
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Meanwhile, other traditional commodities such as gold and U.S. treasuries proved to be more 





















Figure 5: Yearly Performance Comparison of Bitcoin and Other Safe Haven Assets Amidst the Outbreak of Novel         
Coronavirus.  
Taking this into consideration, it would seem that Bitcoin remains too small, too volatile, 
“less liquid, and costlier to transact (in terms of time and fees) than other assets… even in normal 
market conditions” (Young 2020; Smales 2019, 385). Therefore I argue that Bitcoin does not 
seem to fit completely under the classification of a commodity.  
Even if the definition of a commodity were to be altered to address Bitcoin more 
specifically, the framework put forth by the CEA is problematic, as it is possible that many 
Bitcoin transactions would be exempt from the CEA under 17 C.F.R § 1.3. This clause clarifies 
that the term ‘future delivery’ “does not include any sale of a cash commodity for deferred 
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shipment or delivery”, which discounts the majority of Bitcoin transactions (Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Act of 1974; Mandjee 2015, 180). In other words, the CFTC does not have 
jurisdiction over transactions where Bitcoin is exchanged for cash (Massad 2019, 32). 
AML/CFT protections covered 
 CPOs, CTAs, FCMs and IBs are all considered ‘financial institutions’ under the BSA and 
therefore subject to AML/CFT reporting regulations (National Futures Association 2020, 6). In 
addition, FCMs and IBs are also responsible for submitting a “written customer identification 
program” (CIP) to demonstrate that they are aware of their customers’ true identities. CIPs 
necessitate the disclosure of certain PII of customers such as: name, date of birth, residential or 
business address, and SSN or TIN (7). For non-U.S. citizens, FCMs and IBs must obtain a copy 
of some form of government identification, such as a passport, that contains a picture and 
provides evidence of nationality, as well as “a government issued identification number” (7-8). 
 FCMs and IBs are also required to submit SARs with FinCEN if certain transactions 
appear suspicious or “involve an aggregate of at least $5,000 in funds or other assets” (National 
Futures Association 2020, 9). In addition, FCMs and IBs are prohibited from facilitating certain 
transactions with individuals or entities located in a country under a sanction regime delegated 
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (13). Moreover, and they are “required to block 
funds from individuals or entities identified on OFAC’s list of Specially Designated National and 
Blocked Persons (13). 
 Despite this, there are still many loopholes in the CEA and CFTC regulation that 
criminals can exploit. First, criminals can ostensibly apply the same loopholes used to evade 
BSA regulations to also avoid detection by the CFTC. Second, because the CFTC does not have 
jurisdiction over Bitcoin exchanges for cash, criminals could potentially manipulate prices in 
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forward and options contracts, swaps, forex swaps, and Ponzi schemes. Criminals could funnel 
this surplus of cash into larger money laundering schemes or directly to terrorist groups. Even if 
the CFTC were to expand its jurisdiction “to the cash market of crypto-assets which are 
commodities”, it would obfuscate regulatory efforts by splitting jurisdiction between the CFTC 
and the SEC, again creating confusion that criminals could potentially exploit (Massad 2019, 
39).  
The SEC: The Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA 
Overview 
 The Securities Act of 1933 was created to ensure that investors received accurate and 
reliable information about the nature of securities for sale by cracking down on “deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities” (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2013). The SEA created the SEC as the entity responsible for securities oversight, 
charging it with overseeing “registration, disclosure, and antifraud provisions” as well as 
monitoring security exchanges, brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agencies, and securities 
self regulatory organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange (Ly 2014, 597; U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2013). 
Registration of securities with the SEC requires companies to provide information about 
their business (including properties and management), a description of the securities offered, and 
financial statements (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013). However, some security 
offerings may be exempt from registration. Among these, crucially, are “private offerings to a 
limited number of persons or institutions” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013). 
  The SEC has taken an inconsistent approach to Bitcoin regulation. On one hand, the SEC 
supports the CFTC’s designation of Bitcoin as a commodity and argues that “[f]raud and 
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manipulation involving bitcoin traded in interstate commerce are appropriately within the 
purview of the CFTC” (Clayton 2017). On the other hand, the SEC acknowledges that “products 
linked to the value of underlying digital assets, including bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, may 
be structured as securities products subject to registration under the Securities Act of 1933” 
(Clayton 2017). 
Bitcoin properties covered 
 There arise several issues when classifying Bitcoin as a security and attempting to apply 
the regulatory frameworks under the Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA. First, the SEA defines 
a security broadly and includes in its definition stocks, bonds, notes, and investment contracts 
(Ly 2014, 597; Mandje 2015, 176). Taking into consideration the unique properties of Bitcoin, it 
would appear that Bitcoin does not directly fit into any of these categories, perhaps with the 
exception of investment contracts.  
 Bitcoin does not fit the definition of a stock, as “Bitcoins do not carry a right to a 
dividend declared by an issuer, a right to vote on an issuer’s affairs or conduct, or, in fact, any 
kind of right to participate in the economic success of a juridical entity” (Alberts and Fry 2015, 
10). In addition, Bitcoin neither constitutes a note nor a bond, as “transactions for or in Bitcoins 
do not themselves result in any continuing obligation of one party to pay another” (13). Instead, 
there is a possibility that Bitcoin could be representative of an investment contract.  
 In the landmark Supreme Court case SEC v. Shavers, the Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant’s claim that “the Bitcoin investments that he sold were not ‘securities’” and ruled that 
they constituted investment contracts and therefore were indeed securities (Alberts and Fry 2015, 
14). This has incorrectly led to the assumption that Bitcoins are securities and therefore subject 
to SEC regulations (14).  
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In another landmark Supreme Court case, SEC v. Howey, the Supreme Court determined 
that an investment contract requires four features: a person must invest money, the money must 
be invested into a common enterprise, a person must expect to profit from the investment, and 
these expected profits must be “generated solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party” 
(Ly 2014, 598). The SEC itself issued a ‘framework’ for guidance in determining whether 
Bitcoin, ICOs of Bitcoin in particular, constitutes an investment contract.  
ICOs are similar to crowdfunding campaigns; many companies and individuals have been 
using ICOs as a way “to raise capital for their businesses and projects” (Nolan et al. 2018, 2; 
Clayton 2017). As such, ICOs enable “investors to exchange currency such as U.S. dollars or 
cryptocurrencies in return for a digital asset labeled as a coin or token” (Clayton 2017). An ICO 
bears resemblance to a security or a security offering “when the promoters of these offerings 
emphasize the secondary market trading potential of these tokens” (Clayton 2017).  
In conducting a ‘Howey Test’, the SEC found that the investment of money element is 
usually “satisfied in an offer and sale of” Bitcoin, as is the common enterprise feature (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2019, 2). In regards to expectations of profit from third 
parties, the SEC did not provide a definitive answer and instead provided numerous 
circumstances for consideration. The SEC itself acknowledges that “the framework is not 
intended to be exhaustive nor to provide formal legal advice”, but rather serves to help determine 
whether an ICO constitutes an investment contract and is therefore subject to SEC regulation 
(Huillet 2019). 
Upon a more thorough review, it would appear that Bitcoin does not reasonably fit into 
the definition of an investment contract. First, in transactions involving Bitcoin, an individual 
simply pays money to purchase bitcoins; he or she is not investing in Bitcoin itself (Ly 2014, 
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598). Second, Bitcoin does not reasonably fit the investment contract criteria because in most 
circumstances, people who purchase bitcoins “in anticipation of profits do not expect these 
profits to result from the action of the promoter”; instead, they are usually the result of market 
forces (Alberts and Fry 2015, 20-21). Third, and relatedly, the fact that the SEC cannot definitely 
determine that Bitcoin is an investment contract (but rather must examine ICOs on a case-by-
case basis) is arguably indicative of the fact that the SEA framework is not a good fit.  
AML/CFT protections covered 
 In October 2019, the SEC, the CFTC and FinCEN issued a joint statement stressing that 
all companies “with registered digital assets” are subject to AML regulations under the BSA. 
Previously, “[t]rading and investing in digital assets [had] fallen into a regulatory gray area as to 
which existing laws apply” (Johnson 2019). However, the agencies clarified that regulations 
applied irrespective of whether broker-dealers were handling securities or commodities (Johnson 
2019). Although the SEC has taken more comprehensive steps to address AML/CFT concerns, 
under this guidance, criminals can still exploit the same loopholes in the BSA.  
 Additional concerns arise from the fact that under the SEA, private and limited offerings 
need not be registered with the SEC. In this way, it is possible for terrorist groups or organized 
crime syndicates to offer private securities to a limited amount of individuals, for example 
certain previous donors, in order to raise or launder funds. Moreover, there are a number of 
concerns with ICOs in particular. First, an ICO can circumvent the SEC’s crowdfunding 
regulation if the issuer is located outside the U.S. and if it is “offered and sold through funding 
portals and broker-dealers that are registered under the [SEC]” (Nolan et al. 2018, 3).  
Second, unlike an IPO where investors buy shares of a company, the tokens acquired in 
an ICO do not signify ownership in a company (Vorobyev 2018, 210). Moreover, an IPO 
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requires a prospectus case, whereas an ICO requires a “white paper” to outline important 
“information about the project, coins being offered, the rights available to investors, lifecycle of 
the project, other legal terms and conditions, and more” (Tiwari, Gepp, and Kumar 2019, 8). 
However, white papers tend to be significantly less detailed than a prospectus and do not “adhere 
to any specified guidelines” (8). This has presented to criminals “the possibility of raising real 
money without offering anything meaningful in exchange and without preparing any complex 
documentations” (Katarzyna 2019, 6). With this money, it is possible to engage in money 
laundering or terrorist financing.  
The IRS: 2014 Guidance 
Overview 
 In 2014, the IRS issued a Guidance stipulating that Bitcoin is considered a property for 
federal tax purposes (Internal Revenue Service 2014). As such, the market value, as well as the 
basis, of Bitcoin is determined by converting Bitcoin into U.S. dollars at the exchange rate listed 
on an exchange (Internal Revenue Service 2014). Individuals must include payments in Bitcoins 
when determining gross income. This is calculated by determining the market value in U.S. 
dollars of the Bitcoin payment on the day that the payment was received. Gross income also 
applies to the mining of Bitcoins (Internal Revenue Service 2014).  
It is possible for an individual to have a taxable gain “[i]f the fair market value of 
property received in exchange for virtual currency exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of the 
virtual currency” (Internal Revenue Service 2014). The converse is true for a loss, however 
“[t]he character of the gain or loss generally depends on whether the virtual currency is a capital 
asset in the hands of the taxpayer” (Internal Revenue Service 2014). In other words, a capital 
gain or loss applies when the property is a capital asset such as a stock, bond, or another type of 
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investment property. An ordinary gain or loss applies to property that is not a capital asset, which 
includes “inventory and other property held mainly for sale to customers in a trade or business” 
(Internal Revenue Service 2014).   
Bitcoin properties covered  
 Under this framework, Bitcoin is considered a type of property. This is problematic for 
several reasons. First, it would seem the properties of the Bitcoin system clash significantly with 
property law. For example, property law ensures there is an agreement between the sender and 
the recipient of a transfer (Lehmann 2019, 97). However, Bitcoin does not necessitate such an 
agreement. Instead, “[Bitcoin] merely relies on the fulfillment of technological requirements, 
namely the use of the correct private and public key” (97). Property law also assures that when a 
mistake has occurred, the transfer is voidable (103). However with Bitcoin, all transactions are 
irreversible so long as the necessary private key of the sender is matched with the correct 
corresponding public key of the recipient (104). In this way, Bitcoin “does not take into account 
mistakes, fraud, or improper threats” (105). These problems are exacerbated by the fact that it is 
extremely difficult to determine which national law has jurisdiction over a transaction. In 
property law, each transfer is subject to “a governing national law”, however Bitcoin’s 
international reach and pseudo-anonymous properties obfuscate the ability “to identify the state 
which has the closest connection” to the transfer (97). 
  Second, while Bitcoin can operate like a property, as discussed it can also function 
notably as a currency. More specifically, Bitcoin acts like a property in the sense that “holders 
often trade and barter with it”, however it also acts like a currency in so far that it can be used to 
purchase goods and services (Roman 2015, 454). The IRS’ Guidance “sent a panic through the 
industry” as users were primarily using Bitcoin as a payment mechanism and feared its 
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classification as property “signaled the death [of] Bitcoin’s chance at becoming a staple digital 
currency and even potential rival to conventional currency” (Lemchuk 2017, 346-347). 
 Finally, treating Bitcoin as a property means that it would no longer be fungible, which 
carries significant tax implications for everyday purchases. For example with fiat currencies, it 
does not matter whether a person uses a five dollar bill gifted from a friend or one “found on the 
ground” (Lemchuk 2017, 347). However with Bitcoin, “using a coin purchased at $10 will have 
a different, less favorable tax consequence than using a coin purchased at $50” (347).  
AML/CFT protections covered 
 There are significant issues with placing jurisdiction over Bitcoin regulation with the 
IRS, especially in regards to preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. First, the IRS 
is concerned primarily with tax reporting and tax evasion, and therefore does not have 
mechanisms in place to directly address AML/CFT concerns. With this being said, however, the 
IRS has implemented reporting requirements to ensure “taxpayer compliance” (Mirjanich 2014, 
228). As such, Bitcoin users must now “comply with the information reporting requirements 
applicable to other forms of property” such as Form 1099-B, which requires taxpayers to 
disclose transactions with third parties that surpass a certain dollar amount in miscellaneous 
income (228). 
Second, under this framework, the onus is on the consumers to report taxable income 
resulting from their use of Bitcoin. This is problematic, as “the majority of people using the 
virtual currency for illicit transactions have not reported Bitcoin as part of their taxes” (Lovell 
2019, 941). This is complicated by the fact that Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous, which exacerbates 
the IRS’ ability to determine “what ‘gains’ or ‘losses’ are realized from the Bitcoins” (Roman 
2015, 454-455). 
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Third, the extreme fluctuation in the price of Bitcoin obscures users’ ability to determine 
its fair market value and basis (Lovell 2019, 942). This is exacerbated by the fact that users can 
purchase bitcoins from different vendors at different rates and at different times (Roman 2015, 
455). This confusion has emboldened some criminals from underreporting or otherwise 
manipulating the amount in Bitcoin that they report to the IRS, enabling them to evade taxes and 
hide a portion of income that can be used for money laundering or terrorist financing (Lovell 
2019, 942). Moreover, because Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous, “it would be extremely difficult 
for the IRS to track down the records required to sufficiently audit the taxpayer” (Roman 2015, 
455).  
Finally, as a property, a user’s bitcoins could be protected under the Fifth Amendment, 
which grants individuals rights to personal property. If so, this would make seizing a user’s 
bitcoins extremely difficult, and it would require explicit and undeniable proof on the part of law 
enforcement agencies that the holder used the bitcoins for terrorist financing, money laundering, 
or other criminal activities. Logically, providing clear evidence is further complicated by the 
pseudo-anonymous property of Bitcoin. 
My framework: Private Sector Self-Regulation 
Overview  
Bitcoin was created with the explicit purpose of operating outside the purview of formal, 
public sector, regulatory bodies. Thus, to create an effective regulatory framework, I argue 
responsibility should rest primarily with private sector technology companies. This is because 
despite all of the jurisdictional inconsistencies within the U.S. and across the globe, and no 
matter where a user is or when he or she is active, one factor remains the same: in order to 
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procure, access, transact in, or even store bitcoins, a user must have access to a technological 
device that is capable of connecting to the Internet.   
 As such, private sector technology companies should come together to create and 
maintain certain regulatory standards for the community of Bitcoin users. There already exists 
such a grouping: the W3C. This international conglomerate was founded in 1989 with the 
express purpose of creating “open standards to ensure the long-term growth of the Web” (World 
Wide Web Consortium n.d.). Members include various universities, commercial entities such as 
Amazon and Alibaba, technology companies like Microsoft and Toshiba, as well as a range of 
telecommunications companies such as AT&T, Huawei, Samsung, and Verizon. The W3C also 
involves several banks and payment systems, such as PayPal, Wells Fargo, Barclays Bank, and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. The W3C even contains a few governmental members, 
including the Scottish Government and the government offices of India and Hong Kong that deal 
with information technology.  
Considering the wide range of actors involved and their different areas of expertise, I 
argue the W3C is in the best position to tackle effective Bitcoin regulation by imposing self-
regulatory measures. It is in the W3C’s mission to promote safety of and trust in the Web, 
therefore it is in the W3C’s interest to ensure Bitcoin users are not abusing the system. The W3C 
has the added benefit of maintaining international membership. In this way, regulation can be 
centralized and standardized not just in the U.S., but also on an international level. This is crucial 
for two reasons: first, considering the transnational nature of terrorist financing and money 
laundering, this would greatly aid AML/CFT efforts in cases that span multiple international 
jurisdictions, by fostering greater communication and the pooling of resources. Second, 
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standardization would mitigate the legal and jurisdictional mosaic of international perspectives 
on Bitcoin use and regulation.  
However, one major limitation to this framework is that there is no enforcement 
mechanism. In other words, private sector entities do not have the power to make arrests or issue 
fines. As such, regulation should be implemented in a three-tiered framework. This framework 
would adapt a strategy dubbed “real-world assisted virtual currency self-governance” 
(Guadamuz and Marsden 2015). In this way, the W3C would work with companies that provide 
services in Bitcoin – such as the purchase, sale, transfer, exchange, or storage of bitcoins – to 
create community standards and rules on best practices. State governments would bolster the 
W3C by acting as the legal muscle and providing certain enforcement mechanisms (Guadamuz 
and Marsden 2015).  
To elaborate further, the first tier represents the Bitcoin users. They are subject to 
regulations enforced by Bitcoin companies. These Bitcoin companies assume the second tier 
position and are subject to regulation according to the standards agreed upon with the W3C in 
conjunction with state governments. The W3C is the main acting entity in the third tier, with 
oversight over the Bitcoin companies and users. However, the W3C would not be given this 
status without the permission of state governments. In addition, only state governments have the 
power to enforce legal action. In this way, state governments are considered part of the third tier, 
but they play more of a hands-off role as both a consultant and a policing force. In other words, 
state governments help the W3C establish and enforce standards for the community of Bitcoin 
users in accordance with Bitcoin companies, and state governments also take legal action 














Bitcoin companies enforce regulations through a contract that their customers and users 
must agree to upon registering and creating an account with the companies. These contracts 
would include certain terms and conditions that uphold W3C standards. Failure to comply with 
the terms and conditions would result in a user’s account being suspended or terminated.  
In a similar vein, Bitcoin companies must register with the W3C, and in this way, be 
subject to similar terms and conditions that they impose on their own users. Registering with the 
W3C enables Bitcoin companies to become accredited and legitimated on an international level. 
This would be a massive incentive for smaller, newer, and less-well known companies. It might 
also encourage countries that have banned the use of Bitcoin to reconsider, and thus registration 
would be an incentive for companies looking to expand their operations.  
Finally, state governments allow this entire framework to operate. If at any point state 
governments do not agree to the standards, or if they feel the W3C is not effectively overseeing 
the regulatory measures, they can intervene and issue arrests or fines. Alternatively, they can 
Figure 6: Flowchart for a Three-Tiered Framework for Bitcoin Regulation 
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withdraw from the agreement and cease Bitcoin services within their borders. These punitive 
measures would incentivize the W3C to ensure regulation is up to par.  
A potential ‘real-world’ parallel for this framework would be the Global Internet Forum 
to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). The GIFCT was created in 2017 by Facebook, Microsoft, 
Twitter, and YouTube with the goal of promoting human rights and “[preventing] terrorists and 
violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms” (Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism n.d.a). The GIFCT’s membership is restricted exclusively to “companies operating 
internet platforms and services”, and besides the aforementioned four, also includes Pinterest, 
Dropbox, Amazon, LinkedIn, and WhatsApp (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 
n.d.c).  
The GIFCT works closely with different companies, civil society groups, and 
government entities including the United Nations and the European Union in a “Multi-
stakeholder forum” to define and identify terrorist activity (Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism n.d.a). There are three strategic pillars that underpin how the GIFCT and its 
stakeholders carry out its mission: prevent, respond, and learn (Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism n.d.a).  
‘Preventing’ includes ensuring digital platforms and civil society groups are equipped 
with the proper “awareness, knowledge and tools, including technology, to develop sustainable 
programs in their core business operations to disrupt terrorist and violent extremist activity 
online” (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism n.d.a). As part of this initiative, the GIFCT 
has created the Hash Sharing Consortium, which is committed to creating a database of hashes, 
or “unique digital ‘fingerprints’” of images or recruitment videos that have been associated with 
terrorist groups (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism n.d.b). Sharing these hashes 
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enables other platform and service providers to remove content with the same hashes or 
preemptively block it before it is posted (Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism n.d.b).  
 ‘Responding’ involves working with stakeholders to develop the tools necessary to 
mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. This includes a Content Incident Protocol, which is 
designed to track terrorist events in real-time, such as live streams or posts from suspected 
terrorists, and alert the appropriate law enforcement officials (Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism n.d.b). Finally, ‘learning’ includes information sharing, support for research, and 
cooperation across private and public sector entities in order to improve “best practices for multi-
stakeholder cooperation and [prevent] abuse of digital platforms” (Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism n.d.a). 
In parallel to the Bitcoin framework, the W3C is similar to the GIFCT in the sense that 
they are both international bodies composed primarily of private-sector technology companies 
that establish guidelines and standards for a community. Both are responsible for regulating users 
of their platforms, and at the same time, both work with and answer to state governments on 
legal issues and strategies for implementation.  
Bitcoin properties covered  
 Within this framework, Bitcoin is considered a type of technology. Although Bitcoin 
does bear certain hallmarks of a currency, a commodity, a security, and a property, the preceding 
paragraphs in this section have demonstrated that Bitcoin does not effectively fit into any of 
these categories. Instead in order to best regulate Bitcoin, it should be classified as a technology 
with financial components, and it should be included in the growing financial technology 
(FinTech) industry.  
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This is because the entire basis of Bitcoin functionality rests upon the Blockchain 
technology. While the Blockchain can be applied to other non-financial sectors, Bitcoin 
categorically would not be able to exist without the Blockchain. In other words, the Blockchain 
technology is so integrated into the Bitcoin system that Bitcoin should also be considered a new 
type of technology. What sets Bitcoin apart from other technologies, however, is its financial 
component: its ability to possess monetary value that can be traded for goods and services or 
exchanged for fiat currencies. 
Bitcoin’s technical and financial properties make it a good candidate to be included as a 
new technology in the burgeoning FinTech industry. ‘FinTech’, a combination of ‘finance’ and 
‘technology’, is an “umbrella term” referring to “innovative financial solutions enabled by IT 
[information technology]” (Puschmann 2017, 70). In other words, FinTech encompasses 
technological innovations that impact the business and finance sector. Some examples of 
FinTech include “cryptocurrencies and the blockchain, new digital advisory and trading systems, 
artificial intelligence and machine learning, peer-to-peer lending, equity crowdfunding and 
mobile payment systems” (Philippon 2016, 2). From this discussion, it is clear that Bitcoin fits 
under the category of FinTech and should thus be regarded as a new technology with financial 
components and impacts.  
AML/CFT protections covered  
Under this framework, any companies offering services in Bitcoin including the 
purchase, sale, exchange, or storage of bitcoins in a wallet would be required to register with the 
W3C. Registration would give each company credibility, legitimacy, and access for its users on 
W3C members’ technological devices. For example, registration would enable a Bitcoin 
exchange company to offer its app in the Apple App Store and run on Apple products. In return, 
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companies would be required to provide services in such a way so as to prevent users from 
facilitating terrorist financing or money laundering. Companies would also be subject to routine 
audits conducted by the W3C to examine records on users’ activity.  
There are a number of measures to ensure Bitcoin companies and users comply with 
community AML/CFT rules. First, Bitcoin companies could mandate users to disclose certain PII 
including a name, address, SSN, or TIN upon creation of an account. In the event that the 
company discovers potential illicit activity associated with a user, the company would be 
required to suspend that user’s account and submit an activity report to the W3C. If there is 
explicit evidence that a user was using bitcoins for terrorist financing and money laundering, the 
company must immediately terminate that user’s account, which may result in the loss of his or 
her bitcoins. The company would also be required to disclose the user’s identity to the proper 
governmental authorities to take appropriate legal action. Failure to do so would result in these 
companies being blacklisted from offering their services on the technological devices developed 
by W3C members.  
There is precedent that this strategy is effective. For example, in 2019 Apple 
contemplated removing Coinbase Wallet from the App Store for non-compliance issues (Haan 
2019). This followed Google’s temporary move to remove MetaMask, the Android equivalent of 
a bitcoin wallet, from Google Play (Haan 2019). Google determined that MetaMask was in 
violation of Google’s rule to prohibit mining on mobile devices. This rule is most likely in place 
to prevent hackers from using “malware (infectious software) to commandeer vast ‘bot-nets’ 
(zombified networks of hacked devices belonging to innocent parties) for the surreptitious 
mining of cryptocurrencies” (Haan 2019). In both instances, the apps were allowed to remain 
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available through the respective stores after being reconfigured to fit Apple and Google’s 
compliance policies.  
 Second, the W3C could also enforce AML/CFT measures by maintaining a “redlist” of 
“the hashes [cryptographic algorithms] which identify wallets that have been involved in 
criminal activities” (Dinesh, Gilfoyle and Richard 2014, 4). This is similar to the GIFCT’s Hash 
Sharing Consortium. Once on the redlist, the W3C could prohibit Bitcoin companies from 
carrying out transactions connected with these wallets (4). This would prevent individuals from 
donating bitcoins to a redlisted wallet associated with a terrorist group, for example. Such a 
refusal “would make the value of the coins [already] in criminal wallets practically worthless, 
since no transactions can be conducted with them” (4). This would additionally prevent terrorists 
or other criminals from exchanging these coins for fiat currencies in furtherance of their illicit 
activities.  
Finally, the W3C could implement AML/CFT protections by necessitating that 
companies offering certain services in Bitcoin – namely international remittances, charitable 
donations to religious or non-profit organizations, and exchanges for fiat currencies – complete 
and submit detailed reporting forms. These forms would include the reason for the transaction, 
the amount of the transaction, and PII such as the names of the sender and recipient of the 
bitcoins, their addresses, and their SSN, TIN, or other government-issued identification number. 
The reason these services are singled-out specifically is because these are some of the most 
popular ways terrorist groups have procured funding and criminals have disguised finances at the 
placement and layering stages of sophisticated money laundering schemes.  
 Before moving on, it is worth mentioning the benefits this framework has over the others 
that would be in the interest of all actors involved. First, each framework instructs users to 
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disclose sensitive PII in reporting requirements. This undermines Bitcoin’s attractive pseudo-
anonymous quality. However in my framework, I argue that users will be more willing to reveal 
this information directly to private sector entities as opposed to state governments. Indeed, a 
2017 survey conducted by PwC indicated that 72 percent of respondents thought “companies 
[were] better equipped than government to protect their data” (Spain et al. 2017, 3). 
 There are also several benefits to the framework that would be in the interest of all actors 
involved. First, as previously discussed, registering with the W3C gives Bitcoin companies 
legitimacy from which they obviously benefit. However, as more companies are incentivized to 
register, competition for fair pricing and services increases, which benefits users.  
Second, as companies gain more legitimacy, countries that have banned the use of 
Bitcoin might be encouraged to reconsider. This would contribute to the growth of Bitcoin usage 
worldwide, which would benefit Bitcoin companies by increasing profits. It would also benefit 
users – especially “the unbanked and underbanked” – by introducing a new, acceptable payment 
system (Nian and Chuen 2015, 13). Moreover, this framework fosters greater public-private 
sector cooperation while ensuring checks and balances so that neither private sector nor public 
sector entities have a monopoly on the control of Bitcoin transactions. 
Finally, there are several noteworthy benefits to self-regulation. For example, self-
regulation can “be more cost-effective for governments, to the extent that enforcement and 
monitoring burdens are lightened and/or shifted to business” (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2015, 5). In addition, by eschewing government-imposed 
regulations, private sector self-regulation also promises to be “a more flexible instrument that 
could be adapted more easily to deal with changing conditions” (6). Relatedly, by maintaining 
self-regulation according to agreed-upon community standards, participants in the Bitcoin 
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system are more likely to abide by the regulations as opposed to measures imposed from above. 
This has further benefits, as it may mitigate the risk of over-regulation, which could result in the 
reduction of industry innovation, capital flight, and it could push users farther into the ‘dark 
corners’ of the Internet where regulations are more lax but where illicit activities such as terrorist 
financing and money laundering are more prevalent (Avan-Nomayo 2019). Table 1 summarizes 























CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
In analyzing how Bitcoin fits into existing legal and regulatory frameworks in the U.S. – 
namely the BSA, the CEA, the Securities Act of 1933, the SEA, and the IRS’ 2014 Guidance – it 
is apparent that Bitcoin does not fit efficiently into any framework. Instead, I argue that Bitcoin 
should be classified as a new type of technology with financial components, and it should be 
grouped together with other technologies under the burgeoning FinTech industry. As such, 
regulation should rest with private sector entities, namely the W3C, in a three-tiered framework.  
There are several significant limitations to this study. First, achieving international 
consensus on self-regulation led by the private sector will be extremely difficult. I anticipate it 
will take several years before certain countries such as Russia, China, and Iran opt-in to the 
framework. However, considering the benefits, these governments will likely come under 
pressure from businesses, individual users, and the international community, which may push 
these countries to consider adopting the framework.  
Second, the focus of this paper is primarily on countering terrorist financing and money 
laundering. It is not necessarily concerned with tax evasion. Third, criminals can still evade this 
regulatory framework by transacting in Bitcoin on the Dark Web, where detection and 
prevention of terrorist financing and money laundering schemes is extremely difficult. In a 
similar vein, criminals may exploit jurisdictional inconsistencies between different countries. 
Fourth, and related, this framework does not necessarily apply to Bitcoin ATMs, with which a 
user does not need to create an account, register with a company, or use a traceable form of 
payment such as a credit card. In addition, users could evade detection by holding multiple 
wallets, or storing their bitcoins in a ‘hard’ wallet, which is essentially a flash drive.  
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Fifth, this research study represents a broad framework for regulating Bitcoin as a 
technology. It is intended to provide guidance and direction, but not specific details that will 
work in every context. As such, this study would benefit from more research to determine 
specific mechanisms besides redlisting to better detect and prevent terrorist financing, money 
laundering, and other illicit activities. This study would also benefit from further research to 
determine whether the three-tiered framework can be applied to other prominent 
cryptocurrencies and to examine how it would be impacted by the emergence of government-
sponsored virtual currencies.     
Finally, and most importantly, this framework could be rendered obsolete if the price of 
Bitcoin were to stabilize dramatically and consistently. Of the four existing legal frameworks 
analyzed in this paper, Bitcoin least problematically fits into the framework proposed by the 
CFTC. If the price of Bitcoin stabilizes, Bitcoin could reasonably be conceived of as a type of 
commodity, and it could be effectively regulated under the CEA. However, the price of Bitcoin 
is unlikely to stabilize in the near future to the same level of other commodities such as gold. 
Moreover, even if Bitcoin were subject to CEA regulations in the U.S., the same might not be 
said for other countries. In contrast, my framework benefits from international consensus that 














CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 Since Bitcoin was first created in 2008, it has introduced advantages equally as it has 
complications. On one hand, Bitcoin holds promise as a new, international payment system, 
serving those who live in regions where the formal banking sector is compromised by 
widespread corruption, or where it ceases to exist altogether. On the other hand, Bitcoin also 
poses an acute threat to national security, as terrorists and criminals have exploited Bitcoin’s P2P 
and pseudo-anonymous nature in furtherance of their illicit activities. Consequently, there has 
been an international impetus in recent years to classify Bitcoin and determine an appropriate 
regulatory framework. As a result, there has developed an international mosaic of jurisdictional 
inconsistencies, with classification split mostly between a currency or an asset, and regulation 
ranging from an outright ban on Bitcoin usage to passive tolerance.  
Within the U.S. itself, there has emerged a bureaucratic turf war between FinCEN, the 
CFTC, the SEC, and the IRS over how best to conceptualize and regulate Bitcoin. In examining 
the existing legal frameworks imposed by each entity – respectively: the BSA, the CEA, the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA, and the IRS’ 2014 Guidance – it is clear that none truly 
account for the unique properties of Bitcoin, nor do they effectively address AML/CFT concerns.   
 This paper goes beyond the existing legal frameworks in arguing that Bitcoin should be 
classified as a technology with financial components and regulated as a part of the growing 
FinTech industry. As such, regulation should rest primarily with private sector entities. The 
W3C, considering its membership and mission, is poised to assume such a role. Regulation will 
occur through a three-tiered framework according to shared community standards and rules for 
best practices. At the bottom in the first tier are individual users who are subject to regulation by 
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Bitcoin companies, which represent the second tier. These Bitcoin companies are, in turn, 
regulated by the W3C with support from state governments.  
Safety and efficiency need not be zero-sum. Classifying Bitcoin as a technology and 
implementing an international, bottom-up, regulatory framework will enable the international 
community to more effectively counter terrorist financing and money laundering. In this way, 
Bitcoin can then serve its founding purpose: to integrate the underbanked and unbanked into the 
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